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APPELLATE FRUIT SALAD AND OTHER CONCEPTS: 
A SHORT COURSE IN APPELLATE PROCESS 
Foreword 
Writing and arguing an appellate brief is a rite of passage in law 
school, an important part of the law school experience shared by vir-
tually all lawyers. 1 Appellate brief writing was one of the first "skills 
education" activities introduced in the law school curriculum,2 and it 
is one that continues to be used at the majority of American law 
schools.3 Thousands of students participate in moot court annually 
through the required curriculum, co-curricular moot court competi-
tions, or both. 4 Lawyers may recall their moot court experience with 
joy and exhilaration, terror and anguish, or anything in between, but 
no one forgets it. 
Usually, instruction on the appellate problem emphasizes the sub-
stantive issues in the appeal and techniques for effective written and 
1. Amy E. Sloan, Erasing Lines: Integrating the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. AsS'N 
LEGAL WRITlNG DIRECTORS 3, 6 (2002); see also J. Christopher Rideout & Jill 
J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REv. 35, 53-55 (1994) 
(discussing common experiences that define the legal discourse commu-
nity). I would describe it as part of the lawyer's secret handshake, in other 
words, an experience integral to membership in the legal subculture. 
2. Steve Sheppard, An Informal History of How Law Schools Evaluate Students, 
With a Predictable Emphasis on Law School Final Exams, 65 UMKC L. REv. 657 
(1997). Sheppard describes pre-revolutionary English legal education, 
which used moot court arguments as tools both for teaching and evaluating 
students. Id. at 658-59. This was also true of American legal education be-
ginning as early as the eighteenth century. Id. at 689-90. 
3. Association of Legal Writing Directors/Legal Writing Institute, 2004 
ALWD/LltW Survey Highlights 10, http://www.alwd.org/alwdResources/ 
surveys/ 2004surveyresults.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2005) [hereinafter 
ALWD/LltW Survey] (tabulating the responses of 176 schools regarding legal 
writing curriculum and revealing that over 80% of law schools require stu-
dents to write an appellate brief as part of the required legal writing curric-
ulum). This figure has remained fairly constant over time. Compare id., with 
Committee on Appellate Skills Training, Appellate Litigation Skills Training: 
The Role of the Law Schools, 54 U. CiN. L. REv. 129, 141 & n.13 (1985) [here-
inafter Appellate Litigation Skills Training] (reporting data from 1984 indicat-
ing that 82% of law schools required students to participate in appellate 
moot court). 
4. American Bar Association, 2004 Enrollment Statistics 1, http://www.abanet. 
org/legaled/statistics/fa1l2004enrollment.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2005) 
(reporting that 48,239 first-year students enrolled in the 188 accredited law 
schools in the fall of 2004). At least 38,591 students, then, wrote appellate 
briefs in the 2004-2005 academic year alone (80% of 48,239). See ALWD/ 
LltW Survey, supra note 3, at 10. This does not include students who elect to 
participate in co-curricular, intra- or inter-scholastic moot court competi-
tions, which would increase the number significantly. 
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oral advocacy.5 This is entirely appropriate. But the appellate experi-
ence is also an excellent vehicle for familiarizing students with some 
of the fundamental concepts of appellate process. Indeed, unless stu-
dents seek out additional instruction in appellate procedure, their 
work on an appellate problem for a legal writing class or moot court 
competition may be their only exposure to the subject in law schoo1.6 
If the appellate experience does not incorporate instruction on appel-
late process, most students will head into internships, clerkships, and 
practice without knowing much about the procedural aspects of 
appeals. 
As is often the case, the problem is time. Unless the appellate prob-
lem turns on issues of appellate process (and very few do), it is diffi-
cult to make time to devote to instruction on matters not directly 
related to completing the project at hand. This article attempts to 
solve this problem by providing students with a short course in appel-
late process. It explains three important aspects of appellate proce-
dure: standing to appeal, the timing of an appeal, and the extent of 
appellate review. It then provides hypothetical fact patterns and ques-
tions to review the concepts. Students can read the text and complete 
the questions on their own, or professors can assign the reading and 
use the questions for class discussion. Either way, students will benefit 
from exposure to some of the fundamentals of appellate process. 
5. See Robert]. Martineau, Moot Court: Too Much Moot and Not Enough Court, 67 
A.B.A.]. 1294 (1981), reprinted in ROBERT]' MARTINEAU, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
MODERN APPELLATE ADvOCACY app. 3, at 207-09 (1985). 
6. Appellate Litigation Skills Training, supra note 3, at 129. This article contains 
the report and recommendation of the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on Appellate Skills Training of the Appellate Judges' Conference, 
Judicial Administration Division. The report decries the lack of training in 
appellate litigation skills in American law schools. See generally id. 
APPELLATE FRUIT SALAD AND OTHER CONCEPTS: 
A SHORT COURSE IN APPELLATE PROCESS 
Amy E. Sloan* 
I. THREE IMPORTANT CONCEPTS IN APPELLATE PROCESS 
Three procedural issues are important in every appeal: (1) who is 
entitled to appeal; (2) when an order can be appealed; and (3) how 
much review the appellate court will give to the lower court's deci-
sion. 1 Each of these issues is discussed below. 2 
1. "Who is Entitled to Appeal? 
This may sound obvious, but only an aggrieved party to a case can 
appeal an order in the case.3 Many people may have an interest in a 
case, but unless they become parties and subject themselves directly to 
the risks of litigation, they cannot appea1.4 Further, unless the party is 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would 
like to thank the participants at the 2004 Rocky Mountain Legal Writing 
Conference, Stephen Shapiro, and Ann MacNeilie for their feedback on 
the ideas expressed in this paper. I would also like to thank Tamara D. 
Sanders for providing research assistance. 
© 2006 Amy E. Sloan. Permission is granted to copy this article for 
educational uses, as long as the copies are distributed at or below cost, 
identity the author and journal, and contain notice of copyright. 
1. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, 
AND PERSONNEL 5 (1994): 
[A]n appellate court can be activated only pursuant to a rather 
elaborate array of rules deriving from statutes, court-made doc-
trines, written rules of procedure, or some combination of these. 
This technically intricate body of law governs access to the appel-
late courts, determining when, how, and by whom appellate au-
thority can be invoked. 
2. The discussion focuses on federal law. Often, state law regarding appellate 
procedure tracks federal law. Id. at 32. 
3. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980). 
4. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) ("The rule that only parties to a 
lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judg-
ment, is well settled.") (citations omitted); United States v. Seigel, 168 F.2d 
143, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ("It has long been settled that one who is not a 
party to a record and judgment is not entitled to appeal therefrom.") (cita-
tions omitted); see also FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) ("The notice of an appeal shall 
specity the party or parties taking the appeal .... ") (emphasis added); 
United States v. British Am. Tobacco (Invs.) Ltd., 387 F.3d 884, 888 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (determining that a company that intervened in a case for a 
limited purpose could not appeal an order relating to a different aspect of 
the case). 
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aggrieved by the outcome, he or she cannot appea1. 5 
For example, individuals or groups may seek permission to file ami-
cus curiae briefs in a case.6 The individuals or groups filing the briefs 
advocate a particular outcome in the case.7 They often have a stake in 
the outcome of the litigation; their own lives may well be affected by 
the court's ruling. Nevertheless, because they are not parties to the 
litigation, they may not pursue an appeal of a decision they consider 
adverse.8 
As another example, interest groups advocating particular legal 
views often become involved in litigation. If the group itself is a party 
to the case, it can appeal an adverse decision.9 Sometimes, however, 
Of course, rare exceptions to this principle exist, such as when a news 
organization is permitted to appeal a ruling that affects the organization's 
ability to cover a trial. In that case, the news organization is aggrieved by 
the decision, although it is not a party to the underlying action. See, e.g., In 
re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 608 (2d Cir. 1988) (recog-
nizing news organization's standing to challenge a gag order). See generally 
Annotation, Standing of Media Representatives or Organizations to Seek Review of, 
or to Interoene to oppose, Order Closing Criminal Proceedings to Public, 74 AL.R. 
4th 476 (2003). These exceptions, however, are few and far between. 
5. See infra notes 16-20 (discussing when a party is aggrieved). 
6. An amicus curiae is, literally, a "friend of the court," that is, "[a] person 
who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by 
the court to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong inter-
est in the subject matter." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004). 
Thus, an amicus brief, is a brief filed by a non-party to assist the court in 
deciding a case. Id. The brief can only be filed with the court's permission. 
FED. R. APP. P. 29 (establishing the process for seeking leave to file an ami-
cus brief in the federal appellate courts); see also SUP. CT. R. 37(1) ("An 
amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter 
not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable 
help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose 
burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored."). In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003), for example, thirty-three groups filed amicus briefs, in-
cluding: the ACLU of Texas, the Pro Family Law Center, the American 
Public Health Association, the National Mental Health Association, the 
American Orthopsychiatric Association, AIDS Action, the National Alliance 
of State and Territorial Aids Directors, the Association of Nurses in AIDS 
Care, the National Minority AIDS Council, and the Whitman-Walker Clinic, 
among others. Amicus briefs are commonly filed with appellate courts, but 
they can be filed with trial courts as well. See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 
1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982) (determining that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by permitting an amicus to participate in the case). 
7. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 
YALE LJ. 694, 704 (1963) (noting that, at the Supreme Court, "[t]he amicus 
is treated as a potential litigant in future cases, as an ally of one of the 
parties, or as the representative of an interest not otherwise repre-
sented .... Thus, the institution of the amicus curiae brief has moved from 
neutrality to partisanship, from friendship to advocacy."). 
8. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. La. 1989) (noting 
that participation in a case as amicus does not confer standing to appeal); 
see also supra note 4. 
9. A complete discussion of the requirements for an organization to have 
standing to initiate an action on behalf of its members is beyond the scope 
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the interest group's lawyers merely represent one of the parties in the 
case whose claim or defense is consistent with the interest group's 
aims. lo In the latter case, the group is not a party to the litigation and 
cannot appeal an adverse decision if the party the group represents 
decides not to pursue an appeal. 11 
When an individual or entity has a stake in the outcome of a case, 
that person or group may be able to become a party to the litigation 
by intervening in the case. It is possible to intervene at the trial level 
or the appellate level. I2 Indeed, it is possible to intervene solely for 
the purpose of pursuing an appeal that an original party does not wish 
to pursue. I3 Appellate courts are hesitant, however, to allow interven-
tion at the appellate stage. Doing so allows someone to stay on the 
sidelines, leaving others to take on the risk and expense of litigation, 
of this article. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (hold-
ing that the NAACP had standing both to pursue its own rights and to as-
sert the rights of its members in a challenge to Virginia state statutes), with 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (holding that the Sierra 
Club, as an organization with a special interest in environmental protec-
tion, lacked standing to challenge agency action). Suffice it to say, how-
ever, that if an organization has standing to bring an action as a party, it 
also has standing to appeal, assuming, of course, that the organization is 
aggrieved by the outcome in the trial court. See supra note 3. 
10. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 248 (2003) (listing attorneys from 
the ACLU Foundation; NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; 
ACLU Fund of Michigan, Lansing, Mich.; ACLU Fund of Michigan, De-
troit, Mich.; and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund 
as counsel for several respondents in the case). None of these organiza-
tions, though, was a party to the case. Id. 
11. Brown v. Grand Trunk W. RR Co., 124 F.2d 1016, 1016 (6th Cir. 1941) 
(noting that an attorney lacks standing to pursue an appeal except on be-
half of a client); see also supra note 4. 
12. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs intervention in an action before 
a federal district court. FED. R CN. P. 24. A person or entity may seek 
leave of the district court to intervene after the conclusion of the case for 
purposes of filing a notice of appeal, although intervention must take place 
before the expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal. Jenkins ex 
rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 967 F.2d 1245, 1247 (8th Cir. 1992). Further, courts 
have granted requests to intervene made by motion at the appellate level 
for the purpose of pursuing the appeal. See cases cited infra note 13; see 
also FED. R APP. P. 15 (governing petitions to intervene at the appellate 
level in appeals of administrative decisions); FED. R APP. P. 44 (governing 
intervention of the Attorney General of the United States or a state in cer-
tain actions in the appellate courts concerning the constitutionality of a 
statute). 
13. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1985) (granting mo-
tion filed with the appellate court to intervene after the original party aban-
doned the appeal); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882, 883 (8th 
Cir. 1982) (granting motion filed with the appellate court to intervene in 
the case); cf United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 396 (1977) 
(determining that a class member's post judgment motion to intervene for 
purposes of appealing denial of class certification was timely filed); Marino 
v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1998) (holding that retitioners who failed to 
intervene for purpose of appeal could not appea the consent decree en-
tered by the district court). 
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until the case is resolved at the trial level. 14 Ordinarily, a person or 
entity that wishes to participate in the case and influence the outcome 
must intervene at an earlier stage, rather than waiting until the 
appeal. 15 
In addition to being a party, the person or entity wishing to pursue 
an appeal must be aggrieved by the outcome. 16 Parties who get all of 
the relief they requested cannot appeal. 17 You may well wonder why a 
winning party would want to appeal. Sometimes a victory on the mer-
its does not accomplish a party's goal. A party may wish, for example, 
to establish a precedent governing future cases or persuade a court to 
adopt a particular legal theory in resolving the litigated issue. l8 If that 
party were to win with a different theory or on procedural grounds, 
such as lack of jurisdiction, the litigation will not have achieved the 
party's true goal, and the party may feel aggrieved. I9 The right result 
for the wrong reason, however, does not make a party aggrieved.20 As 
long as the party obtained all of the requested relief and the outcome 
is favorable, the party cannot appeal. 
14. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l v. Donovan, 771 F.2d 1551, 1552-53 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). 
15. DANlELJOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 54 (1994). 
16. "Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district 
court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom. A party who 
receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment 
affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank 
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,333 (1980). In rare cases, a winning party may be 
able to appeal an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits, 
id., but that is not the usual circumstance. See generally MEADOR & BERN-
STEIN, supra note 15, at 53-54. 
17. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 445 U.S. at 333. 
18. Watson v. City of Newark, 746 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1984). 
19. A court's failure to base its decision on a party's preferred legal theory may 
leave open an avenue for the defeated party to accomplish an end-run 
around the judgment. In Watson, for example, city employees sought to 
appeal a district court's judgment in their favor based on a finding that the 
city charter was "impermissibly vague." [d. The employees had sought relief 
based on another theory, one that distinguished between partisan and non-
partisan political speech, to which the district court, in dictum, declined to 
give weight. Id. As the appellate court recognized, the result of the deci-
sion was that the city "lost a battle but won the war." Id. Although the plain-
tiffs won a favorable judgment, the city could justify resuming the 
challenged policy under the theory that was effectively rejected by the dis-
trict court. Id. Nevertheless, the court of appeals determined that the 
plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the judgment and, therefore, lacked stand-
ing to appeal. Id.; see also, e.g., Olsen v. Jacklowitz, 74 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 
1935) (dismissing an appeal by a defendant concerned about a subsequent 
suit against him despite a favorable decision below dismissing the plaintiff's 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction). 
20. See Watson, 746 F.2d at 1010; see also Nunez v. Canik, 576 So. 2d 1080, 1083 
(La. Ct. App. 1991) (" [AJ party appealing a judgment in his favor does not 
have the right to appeal simply in order to have the judgment based upon a 
different ground."). 
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To have standing to appeal a decision, a person or entity must be a 
party to the case, whether by suing, by being sued, or by intervening in 
the case. Participation as counselor amicus is insufficient to confer 
standing to appeal. In addition, the party must be aggrieved by an 
adverse outcome in the case. 
2. When Can an Order be Appealed? 
The final order doctrine provides that an appeal can only be taken 
from a final order, that is, an order that finally resolves litigation on 
the merits.21 Authority for federal appellate courts to hear appeals of 
federal district court decisions comes from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which 
confers jurisdiction over appeals of "all final decisions" of federal dis-
trict courts.22 Although the final order doctrine is the rule applied in 
most cases, several exceptions exist. Principles found in statutes, pro-
cedural rules, and court decisions provide avenues for obtaining im-
mediate (or interlocutory) review of an issue prior to the conclusion 
of the litigation and the entry of a final order. To pursue any appeal, 
you must know the basis of the appellate court's jurisdiction.23 
21. A final decision is one that terminates the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing to be done except enforcement of the judgment. Gulf-
stream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1988) (cit-
ing Caitlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). It cannot be a 
provisional disposition of the issue, nor can it be merely a step toward final 
disposition of the merits. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920). Fur-
ther, a final order is one that disposes of the entire controversy; that is, it 
resolves all claims with respect to all parties. Id.; see also Brooks v. Fitch, 642 
F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 528 F.2d 
710,712 (3d Cir. 1975). 
22. This section provides that the federal circuit courts "shall have jurisdiction 
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States 
.... " Many states have similar provisions. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 4(b) (granting district courts of appeal jurisdiction to hear appeals of "fi-
naljudgments or orders of trial courts); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. 
§ 12-301 (LexisNexis 2002) (granting a right to appeal the final judgment 
of a trial court). In the federal courts, the appeal is to an intermediate 
appellate court. This is also true in most states, although in a few states, the 
appeal is directly to the court oflast resort because there is no intermediate 
appellate court. The ten states without intermediate appellate courts are 
Delaware, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Compare MEADOR & BERN-
STEIN, supra note 15, at 144-45 (listing states without intermediate appellate 
courts as of 1994), with KENT C. OLSON, LEGAL INFORMATION: How TO FIND 
IT, How TO USE IT 282 (1999) (providing updated data on states that have 
added intermediate appellate courts). See generally AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LE-
GAL RESEARCH: TOOLS & STRATEGIES 73-75 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the 
structure of federal and state court systems). 
23. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) (4) (D) requires the appellant's 
brief to include "an assertion that the appeal is from a final order or judg-
ment that disposes of all parties' claims, or information establishing the 
court of appeals' jurisdiction on some other basis." The appellee's brief 
may omit the jurisdictional statement unless the appellee disagrees with the 
appellant's statement. FED. R. APP. P. 28(b). 
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The rules regarding when orders can be appealed illustrate the ten-
sion between three sometimes-competing values that appellate courts 
try to balance: efficiency, finality, and accuracy.24 The interest in effi-
ciency supports the final order rule. It is usually more efficient to 
evaluate all potential errors at the conclusion of the litigation, espe-
cially because some errors may be corrected before the end of the 
case or may prove to be harmless.25 The interest in the finality of 
litigation also supports the rule that only final orders can be appealed. 
Otherwise, cases could bounce back and forth between the trial and 
appellate levels, taking far too long to conclude.26 The interest in ac-
curacy, on the other hand, might counsel adherence to a rule permit-
ting interlocutory appeals. Some mistakes cannot be corrected once 
they have determined the course of litigation, some cases are so com-
plex that requiring all parties to wait until all claims are resolved to 
appeal may work injustice, and some questions may be so important 
or controversial that delaying their resolution would create unwar-
ranted confusion or uncertainty in the legallandscape.27 In those cir-
cumstances, interlocutory appeals might be advantageous. 
The balance among these values, in most cases, supports applica-
tion of the final order rule, but with exceptions for the types of issues 
for which delay in appellate review presents problems. Some of the 
more common exceptions include:28 orders involving injunctions;29 
24. Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Arror, 88 
COLUM. L. REv. 79, 90 (1988) (recognizing appellate values of accuracy, 
finality, and efficiency); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: 
Court Rulemakinf5> Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. LJ. 
887,913 (1999) (arguing that accuracy should be the preeminent consider-
ation in judicial rulemaking). 
25. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 45-46. 
26. Justice Frankfurter explained the rationale underlying the final order rule: 
Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of fed-
eral appellate procedure. It was written into the first Judiciary Act 
and has been departed from only when observance of it would 
practically defeat the right to any review at all. Since the right to a 
judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a 
necessary ingredient of justice, Congress from the very beginning 
has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for 
practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfee-
blingjudicial administration. Thereby is avoided the obstruction to 
just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and 
cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to 
which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judg-
ment. To be effective, judicial administration must not be leaden-
footed. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate 
reviews of the component elements in a unified cause. 
Cobble dick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940) (footnotes 
omitted). 
27. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE CIVIL PRACTICE - FEDERAL AND 
STATE APPEALS §§ 4.1-.2, at 47-49 (1983) (discussing how the finality rule 
promotes efficiency but can be in tension with accuracy). 
28. The number of exceptions may well increase in the future because the Su-
preme Court is now empowered to adopt rules designating additional types 
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orders involving unsettled questions of law, which can be certified for 
immediate appeal;30 orders dismissing a claim or party in a case with 
multiple claims or parties;31 and so-called "collateral" orders.32 In ad-
dition, the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus provide 
vehicles for obtaining immediate appellate review of issues that are 
not otherwise immediately appealable.33 Comparing different types 
of orders to pieces of fruit, an analogy I call "appellate fruit salad," 
helps classify orders to determine whether they are subject to the final 
order rule or fall within one of its exceptions. 
A case subject to the final order doctrine is analogous to a whole 
apple. One involving an injunction or issue certified for immediate 
appeal is analogous to an apple with a bite taken out of it. A case with 
multiple claims or parties is analogous to a bunch of grapes. A case 
involving a collateral order is analogous to a cashew fruit, while one 
involving an extraordinary writ is analogous to a watermelon. 
In an appellate court's eyes, most cases are like apples. Just as an 
apple is a single piece of fruit, most cases are single pieces of litiga-
tion. The plaintiff sues the defendant on a claim, the claim is resolved 
by motion or trial, and the case is concluded. The order that con-
cludes the litigation on the merits, leaving nothing substantive for the 
trial court to do, is appealable to a higher court. 34 
Appellate courts are strongly disinclined to disturb the integrity of 
the apple. In other words, they do not like litigants to be able to take 
a bite out of the apple to appeal some intermediate aspect of the 
case.35 Appellate courts prefer that the entire case - the whole apple 
- come to them at once.36 This makes sense when the purpose of the 
review is error correction, the primary function of intermediate appel-
of orders as immediately appealable. 28 v.s.c. § 1292(e) (2000) ("The Su-
preme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this 
title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of 
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or 
(d)."). 
29. 28 v.s.c. § 1292(a)(1) (2000). 
30. [d. § 1292(b). 
31. FED. R. CIY. P. 54(b). 
32. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 V.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
33. The All Writs Act, 28 V.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2000). 
34. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 V.S. 271, 275 (1988) 
(quoting Caitlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)) ("This Court 
long has stated that as a general rule a district court's decision is appealable 
under [§ 1291] only when the decision 'ends the litigation on the merits 
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' "). 
35. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 
(1987) (explaining that interlocutory appeals can result in disruption, de-
lay, and expense for litigants, "burden appellate courts by requiring imme-
diate consideration of issues that may become moot or irrelevant by the 
end of trial," and interfere with the trialjudge's authority to supervise litiga-
tion without interference). 
36. Cobble dick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-35 (1940). 
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late courts,37 and is consistent with the values of efficiency, finality, 
and accuracy. 
Sometimes, however, appellate courts permit litigants to take a bite 
out of the apple and take an interlocutory appeal of some aspect of 
the case. Two types of orders subject to interlocutory review are those 
involving injunctions and those certified for immediate appeal. Au-
thority for the federal appellate courts to hear these cases comes from 
28 U.S.C. § 1292. 
Subsection (a) of the statute confers jurisdiction for interlocutory 
appeals of orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dis-
solving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions 
.... "38 In the case of injunctions, the exception is consistent with the 
value of accuracy, and in this case, accuracy trumps efficiency and fi-
nality. This is because the grant or denial or modification or refusal 
to modify an injunction can have irreversible consequences that can-
not be remedied later.39 Thus, the cost of an erroneous decision is 
too high to delay review until the conclusion of the case. Also, injunc-
tions affect behavior, either requiring or prohibiting litigants to act in 
particular ways. For an injunction issued before the conclusion of the 
litigation, the grant of relief prior to proof of entitlement to it is an 
extraordinary remedy.40 Given the length of time many cases take to 
conclude, a preliminary grant of relief may remain in effect for 
yearsY To require the affected party to wait until the conclusion of 
the litigation to demonstrate error is too high a price to impose. 
37. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3-4; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976). 
38. 28 U.S.c. § 1292(a)(1). The statute also provides a mechanism for appeal-
ing other types of equitable matters, such as the appointment of receivers 
and decisions in admiralty cases. Id. § 1292(a) (2)-(3). For purposes of sim-
plicity, I have limited the appellate fruit salad analogy to cases involving 
injunctions and orders certified for immediate appeal. 
39. See Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (explaining that 
the grant or continuation of an injunction can have irreparable conse-
quences); Cohen v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of 
N]., 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that the serious conse-
quences flowing from denials and modifications of injunctions justifY inter-
locutory appeals of those orders); see also Stewart-Warner Corp. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, j., 
dissenting) (explaining that orders denying injunctions are immediately 
appealable because the erroneous denial of an injunction may cause irrepa-
rable injury). 
40. Frank's GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (recognizing that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy); see also Williams v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 251 
(W.D. Tex. 1992) (recognizing that a preliminary injunction is an ex-
traordinary remedy). 
41. See, e.g., Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health and 
Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing a prelimi-
nary injunction that was entered eight years before a final judgment); 
Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1269 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing a 
preliminary injunction that had been in effect for more than fifteen years); 
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In the case of orders certified for immediate appeal, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292 recognizes the occasional need for such an interlocutory ap-
peal, but makes obtaining it difficult. Subsection (b) provides as 
follows: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order 
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the 
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, 
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Ap-
peals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such ac-
tion may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be 
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten 
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That appli-
cation for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in 
the district court unless the district judge or the Court of 
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.42 : 
The statute imposes several conditions before the appeal can be 
heard. First, the order at issue must arise in a civil case, not a criminal 
case.43 Second, it must involve "a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion .... "44 
Third, the aggrieved party must persuade the district court to certifY 
the order for immediate appea1.45 Finally, the circuit court must 
choose to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal immediately.46 
Otherwise, the appeal must be taken in the normal course upon the 
conclusion of the litigation. 
This process is consistent with the values of efficiency, accuracy, and 
finality. Although in most cases, it is more efficient to wait until the 
conclusion of a case to hear all errors in one appeal, in the case of a 
controlling question of law, it may be more efficient for the appellate 
court to resolve the issue immediately.47 Unlike other types of errors 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549,551 (9th Cir. 1990) (dis-
cussing a preliminary injunction that had been in place for six years). Sta-
tistics collected by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
show that many civil cases in the federal courts take years to conclude. As 
of September 30, 2004, 12.6% of civil cases in federal district courts had 
been pending for three years or longer. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 2004, app., tbl.C-6 at 165 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus 
2004/ appendices/ c6. pdf. 





47. Hickey v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 270 
F. Supp. 2d 357, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting certification for interlocu-
tory appeal of an order concerning the scope of federal jurisdiction be-
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that may be corrected before the end of the litigation or may turn out 
to be harmless, an error in the application of a controlling question of 
law results in wasted resources.48 Although the immediate appeal can 
delay the resolution of the case in the trial court, it can improve the 
overall efficiency of the judicial process by resolving the legal question 
before trial. This is also consistent with the goal of accuracy because it 
allows for immediate review of any potentially erroneous decision. 
The certification process could be seen as in conflict with the value 
of finality. To the extent that it is, the interests in efficiency and accu-
racy trump finality in this instance. The provisions requiring the dis-
trict court to certify the order as final and allowing the court of 
appeals the discretion to decline to hear the appeal immediately help 
reduce the effect on finality by ensuring that only those issues truly 
meriting immediate review get past the procedural hurdles. 49 
Of course, not all cases are like unitary, whole pieces of fruit. Some 
involve multiple parties or multiple claims, which, although arising 
from the same set of facts, are separable. The apt comparison here is 
not with an apple, but rather, with a bunch of grapes. In these cases, 
each claim (or set of claims) against each party can be separated from 
other aspects of the case without disturbing the integrity of the case 
(fruit) as a whole. Taking a grape off a bunch is not the same as 
taking a bite out of an apple. 
Authority for an appeal under these circumstances comes from Fed-




When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 50 
cause doing so would avoid uncertainty regarding the binding effect of the 
court's ruling and the potential duplication of proceedings). 
Mineo v. Port Auth., 779 F.2d 939, 942 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining 
that the district court certified an order regarding coverage of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act for immediate appeal to avoid wasting resources with a 
lengthy proceeding to establish damages in the event that the district 
court's ruling on the controlling question of law was later overturned). 
See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 
58 CEO; WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1172-75 (1990) (discussing the limitations on 
interloc'utory appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and compiling statis-
tics showing that appellate courts rarely exercise their discretion to accept 
such appeals). 
Many states have directly adopted rules that are identical or substantially 
similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), including, for example, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Utah, and Wyoming. HAw. R. ClY. P. 54(b); 
IDAHO R. ClY. P. 54(b); MASs. R. ClY. P. 54(b); UTAH R. ClY. P. 54(b); WYO. 
R. ClY. P. 54(b). 
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This rule is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), concerning certification of 
an order for immediate appeal, in that it applies only to civil cases and 
gives the district court the discretion to decide whether to direct entry 
of an order subject to immediate appeal. It differs, however, in other 
respects. The order at issue need not involve a controlling question of 
law about which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. 
In addition, the appellate court does not have discretion to refuse the 
appeal. Once the district court directs entry of final judgment, the 
order becomes immediately appealable as a final order. Despite the 
differences between this rule and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), each provision 
reflects a similar balance among efficiency, accuracy, and finality. 
Another exception to the final order rule is the collateral order 
doctrine. The collateral order doctrine originated in Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Industrial Loan Corp. 51 This was a shareholder derivative action 
that required the district court to decide whether a state statute re-
quiring the plaintiffs to post a bond applied.52 The district court 
ruled that the statute did not apply, and the defendant appealed.53 
Before addressing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court 'had to 
determine whether the order was appealable, given that the district 
court's judgment did not resolve the litigation finally on the merits. 54 
The Court determined that the order was subject to immediate ap-
peal, saying that the 
decision appears to fall in that small class which finally deter-
mine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and 
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is 
adjudicated. 55 
The Supreme Court's enunciation of the collateral order rule in Cohen 
was eventually distilled into three elements. A collateral order "must 
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important 
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."56 
51. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
52. [d. at 543. 
53. [d. at 545. The Court of Appeals reversed, Cohen appealed, and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. [d. 
54. ld. at 545-46. 
55. [d. at 546. 
56. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (quoting numerous 
cases to reaffirm the elements of the collateral order doctrine and rejecting 
the "death knell" test developed by the courts of appeals in which orders 
that sounded the "death knell" of an action had been immediatelyappeala-
ble under Cohen without necessarily meeting the three required elements), 
superseded lYy rule, 177 F.R.D. 530,530-31 (1998). Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23(f) now gives federal appellate courts the discretion to hear ap-
peals of orders granting or denying class certification, including when the 
order at issue sounds the "death knell" of class action litigation. Blair v. 
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Cohen illustrates the justification for the rule: If the district court's 
decision denying application of the statute, thereby allowing the plain-
tiffs to proceed without posting a bond, had not been immediately 
appealable, the defendant's right to appeal that decision at the end of 
the litigation would have been meaningless.57 The plaintiffs would 
already have been permitted to proceed without the bond. The order 
in Cohen also met the other two requirements. The district court's 
order allowing the case to proceed without the bond conclusively de-
termined the issue of the applicability of the statute. 58 Further, the 
applicability of the statute was separate from the merits of the claims 
of mismanagement and fraud that formed the basis of the share-
holder suit.59 Permitting the appeal under these circumstances thus is 
consistent with the value of accuracy and does not conflict with the 
value of finality. Although it may run counter to the value of effi-
ciency, in this case, accuracy trumps efficiency because the cost of an 
erroneous decision (the effective loss of the right to appeal) is too 
high.60 
Cases falling under the collateral order doctrine can be compared 
with cashew fruits. This comparison may not be helpful to those unfa-
miliar with cashew fruits, so some explanation is in order. A cashew 
nut grows with a piece of fruit, known as a cashew fruit. In many parts 
of the world, people eat the fruit, whereas most of us are more famil-
iar with the nut. 61 Collateral orders are similar to cashew fruits in the 






Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999). This is an 
example of a rule designating a new type of order as immediately appeala-
ble pursuant to the Supreme Court's rule making power in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(e). See supra note 28. 
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556. 
Id. at 556-57. 
Id. at 546-47. 
Courts have categorized a variety of types of orders as collateral orders. See, 
e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141 
(1993) (allowing immediate appeal of an order denying a state's claim of 
11th Amendment immunity); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 347 & n.8 (1987) (allowing immediate appeal of an order allocating 
the costs of identifying class members in a class action suit); Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (allowing immediate appeal of an order 
denying a government official's claim of qualified immunity). The collat-
eral order doctrine can also be invoked in criminal cases. See, e.g., Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176-77 (2003) (allowing immediate appeal of 
an order requiring a criminal defendant to take medication in order to 
make him competent to stand trial); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1989) (noting that the collateral order rule 
has been successfully invoked in criminal cases only in limited circum-
stances involving the following types of orders: orders denying motions to 
reduce bail, to dismiss indictments on double jeopardy grounds, and to 
dismiss indictments under the Speech and Debate Clause of the 
Constitution) . 
A picture of a cashew fruit is available on the Internet. The Food Mu-
seum-Cashew, http://www.foodmuseum.com/cashew.html (last visited 
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collateral order (the nut), although the two parts are joined together 
and are part of a single entity. Nevertheless, the nut can be broken off 
from the fruit and eaten or processed separately, just as a collateral 
order can be appealed without disturbing the integrity of the proceed-
ings on the merits. 
One final way of obtaining immediate review of a lower court's ac-
tions is through the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibi-
tion.62 These writs, of course, direct an official, such as a district court 
judge, to act in a manner necessary to fulfill her duties or stop acting 
in a way that is contrary to her authority.63 Although these writs look 
like and, in many ways, operate like appeals, they are not appeals. A 
petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition is a request separate 
from the underlying case that is filed as an original matter with the 
appellate court.64 If the petition is granted, the order is directed to 
the judge.65 Thus, although the extraordinary writs are methods for 
obtaining immediate review of lower court actions, they are not true 
appeals. 
Because of the differences between direct appeals and petitions for 
extraordinary writs, the extraordinary writs are best analogized to 
watermelons. The reason for the comparison might not be apparent 
at first. A petition for an extraordinary writ is comparable to a 
watermelon because a watermelon is not a fruit. According to the Na-
tional Watermelon Promotion Board, a watermelon is a vegetable.66 
Thus, just as a watermelon seems like a fruit, a petition for an ex-
traordinary writ seems like a procedure for an interlocutory appeal. 
Sept. 4, 2005). A Coogle image search for "cashew fruit" also retrieves a 
number of pictures. The fruit is sometimes called a cashew apple. [d. 
62. The All Writs Act, 28 u.s.c. § 1651(a) (2000), provides that "[t]he Su-
preme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 
63. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 u.S. 578, 582-83 (1943); Roche v. Evaporated 
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); see also 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, AR-
THUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3932.2 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that the technical and historic differences 
between mandamus and prohibition are of little concern). 
64. Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541 F.2d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1976) ("A pro-
ceeding upon a petition for a writ of mandamus is a separate action, not an 
appeal .... "); People exrel. Tinkoffv. Campbell, 212 F.2d 785, 786 (7th Cir. 
1954) (explaining that a petition for a writ of mandamus, as a collateral 
proceeding, is separate from the parent case and is filed as an original 
cause with the appellate court); see also WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra 
note 63, at § 3932 (stating that extraordinary writ proceedings are com-
menced by an original application to an appellate court). 
65. The court below is often named as a party in the mandamus action. See, 
e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 124 S.Ct. 2576 (2004), m~ndamus 
granted, 406 F.3d 723, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
66. National Watermelon Promotion Board-Fun Facts, http://www.water 
melon.org/index.asp?a=dsp&htype=funn&pid=32 (last visited Sept. 13, 
2005). 
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In reality, however, the watermelon is a vegetable, not a fruit, and a 
petition for an extraordinary writ is a vehicle for obtaining immediate 
review of certain actions by the court below, not a true interlocutory 
appeal of the underlying case. 
Writs of mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies.67 
To obtain a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must first show that he 
or she has no other adequate way to obtain the relief sought.68 This 
requirement is intended to prevent litigants from using a petition for 
a writ as a substitute for the ordinary appellate process.69 The peti-
tioner must then demonstrate that the right to the writ is "clear and 
indisputable."70 If the petitioner satisfies both of these requirements, 
the issuing court must satisfy itself that issuing the writ is an appropri-
ate exercise of discretion under the circumstances.71 Even if the ap-
pellate court disagrees with a decision and might well reverse the 
decision on a direct appeal, it is rare for an appellate court to enter an 
order telling a lower court that it has acted in an unauthorized or 
unacceptable way.72 This is not to say that petitions for extraordinary 
67. The Supreme Court has explained the purpose of a writ of mandamus: 
[It] has traditionally been used in the federal courts only "to con-
fine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdic-
tion or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do 
so." While the courts have never confined themselves to an arbi-
trary and technical definition of 'jurisdiction," it is clear that only 
exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial "usurpation of 
power" will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. 
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (citation omitted); accord Che-
ney, 542 U.S. at_, 124 S. Ct. at 2586 (characterizing mandamus as "drastic 
and extraordinary" (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947))); 
Steward v. West, 449 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting the extraordi-
nary nature of writs of prohibition and mandamus and stating that courts 
will not issue the writs absent a strong showing that their use is necessary); 
Zerilli v. Thornton, 428 F.2d 476, 477 (6th Cir. 1970) (noting the excep-
tional nature of a writ of mandamus). 
68. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (denying petition for a writ of 
mandamus to vacate the district court's orders allowing attorneys' fees be-
cause the issue could be addressed adequately through an appeal in the 
ordinary course of litigation). 
69. Id.; see also Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, llO (1964) (noting that it 
is not appropriate to use a petition for a writ of mandamus as a substitute 
for a direct appeal). . 
70. Wil~ 389 U.S. at 96 (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 
379,384 (1953)). 
71. Id. at 95. 
72. See, e.g., Fahey, 332 U.S. at 260 (denying petition for a writ of mandamus to 
vacate the district court's orders allowing attorneys' fees because the issue 
could be addressed adequately through an appeal in the ordinary course of 
litigation); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21,27 (1943) (revers-
ing circuit court's issuance of a writ of mandamus directed toward a district 
court because the district court's decision, even if erroneous, was not an 
abuse of power, was within its jurisdiction, and was subject to effective re-
view through the normal appellate process). 
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writs are never granted, only that the standard for obtaining them is 
very high.73 
In any appeal, the appellate court must have jurisdiction to hear the 
case. Jurisdiction attaches when a final order resolves the litigation 
below or when one of the exceptions to the final order rule permits 
the appeal. In addition, the appellate court has jurisdiction to resolve 
a petition for one of the extraordinary writs. 
3. How Much Review Will the Appellate Court Undertake? 
Once a case makes its way to the appellate stage, the appellate court 
must decide how much review of the trial court's decision it will pro-
vide. The answer turns on two concepts: scope of review and stan-
dard of review. Scope of review refers to the breadth of issues the 
appellate court is willing to review. Standard of review refers to the 
depth, or degree, of scrutiny the appellate court will give to an issue. 
Ordinarily, an appellate court first evaluates whether an issue falls 
within the scope of its review and then assesses the merits of the issue 
according to the appropriate standard of review. 
A litigant may identify many errors below that it would like the ap-
pellate court to review. Scope of review concerns how many of those 
issues the appellate court is willing to consider.74 A litigant usually 
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. 75 An appellate court 
rarely considers issues that were not raised below or that were not 





For example, a petition for a writ of mandamus may be the only way to get 
review in a criminal case because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), permitting certification of certain orders as final, do 
not apply to criminal cases. Walter J. Bonner, Federal Interlocutory Appeals 
and Mandamus 228 in APPELLATE PRACTICE FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER: 
STATE AND FEDERAL (Paul Mark Sandler & Andrew D. Levy eds., 2d ed. 
2001). For a discussion of writs of mandamus in the criminal context, see 
generally Wil~ 389 U.S. at 97-98. 
Kathleen L. Coles, Mixed Up Questions of Fact and Law: Illinois Standards of 
Appellate Review in Civil Cases Following the 1997 Amendment to Supreme Court 
Rule 341,28 S. ILL. U. LJ. 13, 17 (2003) ("[Scope ofreview],in its narrower 
meaning, refers to the particular actions or omissions by the decision-
maker that are or are not subject to review on appeal."). 
See, e.g., Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-57 (1941) (noting that ap-
pellate courts generally do not consider issues not raised below except in 
the exceptional cases in which failure to consider the issue might result in 
injustice); United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 (lst Cir. 1992) ("It is a 
bedrock rule that when a party has not presented an argument to the dis-
trict court, she may not unveil it in the court of appeals."). 
See supra cases cited in note 75. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46 requires 
parties to bring errors to the district court's attention: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unneces-
sary; but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore 
been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or 
order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the 
action which the party desires the court to take or the party's objec-
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hundreds of years. 77 Before appellate courts existed, litigants who be-
lieved the judge or jury made errors in deciding a case brought a new 
suit against the judge or jury to hold them responsible for those er-
rors. 78 In the subsequent suit, the judge or jury could not be held 
responsible for matters that had not been raised in the initial suit.79 
The modern justification for the rule takes us back to the values of 
efficiency, finality, and accuracy. If errors are brought to the trial 
court's attention when they occur, the trial judge has an opportunity 
to correct them, thus fostering efficiency and accuracy.80 The objec-
tion or exception ordinarily must be reflected in the trial record to 
demonstrate that the litigant claiming error brought the purported 
error to the trial court's attention.81 The objection or exception may 
be in writing, as is often the case with exceptions to jury instructions, 
or oral, as is often the case when a lawyer objects to the introduction 
of evidence at tria1.82 In addition, appellate courts do not want liti-
gants to hold back arguments, wait to see how the case is resolved, and 
then take another bite at the apple, to use the fruit metaphor in a 
different context, with a new argument on appea1.83 Allowing that 
type of litigation strategy runs counter to efficiency and finality by re-
quiring a second forum in which to raise issues that could have been 
resolved below.84 It also runs counter to accuracy. Waiting until ap-
peal to raise an issue deprives the trial court of the opportunity to 
make an accurate decision if the issue is, in fact, dispositive.8s 
tion to the action of the court and the grounds therefor; and, if a 
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it 
is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice 
the party. 
The same is true in criminal cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51 (b). 
77. Edson R. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REv. 3, 
7,9 (1940). 
78. Id. at 7. 
79. Id. at 9. 
80. Busy v. Nevada Const. Co., 125 F.3d 213, 218 (9th Cir. 1942). 
81. Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.l (3d Cir. 
1982), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983). 
82. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure lO(a) provides that: 
The following items constitute the record on appeal: 
(1) the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court; 
(2) the transcripts of the proceedings, if any .... 
An objection must appear in the record to be preserved for 
appeal. 
83. Moore v. United States, 262 F.2d 216,218 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (explaining that 
a defendant cannot hold back an argument in the trial court and then rely 
on that argument to seek reversal of his conviction); Busy, 125 F.2d at 218 
(explaining why litigants cannot hold arguments aside until the appellate 
stage). 
84. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 56. 
85. Pfeifer, 678 F.2d at 457 n.l; see also MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 
56 (explaining that the requirement that issues be raised in the first in-
stance with the trial court flows from concerns of accuracy, efficiency, and 
finality) . 
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One exception to this rule is the plain error doctrine. If the failure 
to raise an issue below is so egregious that refusal to consider it on 
appeal would amount to a denial of justice, the appellate court will 
consider it for the first time on appea1.86 For an issue to qualify for 
review in the absence of a proper objection below, an error must have 
occurred, the error must be "plain," and the error must affect substan-
tial rights.87 Even when all three factors exist, correction of the error 
is within the appellate court's discretion, which it should exercise only 
if "the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputa-
tion of judicial proceedings."88 This is obviously a difficult standard to 
meet; appellate courts are rarely persuaded to reverse for plain error, 
although they do so from time to time.89 
One interesting aspect of the plain error doctrine concerns its rela-
tionship to standard of review. The plain error doctrine effectively 
collapses the two-step process appellate courts usually use to evaluate 
the amount of review they will provide on an issue into one step. As· 
noted above, an appellate court usually determines first whether the 
issue was raised and preserved below and then evaluates the issue on 
the merits. With the plain error doctrine, the evaluation of the merits 
determines both the court's willingness to consider the issue and its 
86. In criminal cases, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that 
"[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even 
though it was not brought to the court's attention." The federal appellate 
courts also apply the plain error doctrine in civil cases. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19,26 (lst Cir. 1999) (applying the plain error stan-
dard in a civil case); Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 131 F.3d 1120, 
1124 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying plain error in a civil case). Harmless errors, 
by contrast, do not affect substantial rights and must be disregarded. FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 52(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 61. A harmless error will not justify rever-
sal. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting 
that a trial court's ruling will not be overturned for harmless error). A 
discussion of plain error would be incomplete without an explanation of 
the difference between forfeiture and waiver of a claim. An error to which 
no objection is made is forfeited. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993). The plain error doctrine is a mechanism for obtaining review of a 
forfeited claim. Id. at 732. Claims that have been waived, by contrast, will 
not be reviewed by an appellate court at all. Id. at 733. Waiver is the volun-
tary relinquishment of a known right. Id. For example, a defendant who 
enters a guilty plea waives the right to a trial. Id. Much litigation centers 
on whether a particular waiver is valid, but once a court determines that the 
claim was waived, it will not review the claim. Id. 
87. Id. at 732; see also Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d at 26. 
88. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
89. The cases in which courts have found plain error are factually varied. See, 
e.g., United States v. Hanno, 21 F.3d 42, 48-49 (4th Cir. 1994) (accepting 
removal of jurors without notice to the defendant as justification for vacat-
ing convictions on plain error review); United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957, 
963 (9th Cir. 2000) (accepting "highly prejudicial" jury instructions as justi-
fying reversal for plain error). 
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resolution on the merits.90 If, after evaluating the merits, a court de-
termines that a plain error exists and is therefore within its scope of 
review, the court does not then apply a separate standard of review to 
resolve the issue.91 Rather, a finding of plain error will result in rever-
sal, without reference to the standard of review that otherwise would 
apply if the error had been properly preserved. Stated differently, be-
cause a plain error is so serious that it requires reversal on the merits, 
the court will relax its usual rule requiring that the issue be raised 
below. 
Once the appellate court determines the breadth of issues it will 
consider, it must then determine how closely to review the decision 
below, or in other words, the depth of its review. The standard of 
review refers to the depth of review the court will provide.92 
Appellate courts generally apply one of three standards of review: 
de novo, clearly erroneous, or abuse of discretion. De novo review 
gives no deference to the decision below, allowing the appellate court 
to reevaluate an issue on its own.93 It applies primarily to questions of 
law.94 Two reasons are usually advanced for this searching degree of 
review. First, a trial court may have to make decisions quickly, in the 
heat of trial, whereas the appellate court can take as much time as it 
needs to consider and resolve the issue.95 Second, one of the func-
tions of appellate courts is to clarify ambiguities in the law or even 
make new legal rules when necessary, and appellate decisions have 
precedential value affecting the resolution of future cases.96 Giving 
90. See Fuchs, 218 F.3d at 962 (noting the discretionary nature of plain error 
review). 
91. Review for plain error, in effect, is itself a standard of review, obviating the 
need for application of additional standards. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 385 (2000) (characterizing plain error review as a "familiar stan-
dard of review"). 
92. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 59. Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 28(a) (9) (B) requires that the appellant'S brief contain "for each 
issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review (which may 
appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate heading placed 
before the discussion of the issues) .... " The appellee's brief may omit the 
statement of the standard of review unless the appellee disagrees with the 
appellant's statement. FED. R. J\pP. P. 28(b) (5). 
93. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991); United States v. 
George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 
1537, 1539 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
94. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 
95. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) 
(explaining that one reason why appellate courts are better positioned than 
trial courts to resolve questions of law is that they are not encumbered by 
the process of hearing evidence), abrogated on other grounds fly Estate of 
Merchant v. Comm'r., 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991). 
96. In reality, a large number of appellate decisions are non-precedential. Amy 
E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opin-
ions fly Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. LJ. 711, 718-19 (2004). Neverthe-
less, when an appellate court chooses to make its opinion precedential, the 
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appellate courts plenary review of questions of law is consistent with 
this function. 
Clearly erroneous is the standard applied to review of questions of 
fact decided by the judge.97 This is a more deferential standard than 
de novo review. According to the Supreme Court, "[a] finding is 
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."98 The appellate 
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, even if 
the appellate court might have ruled differently if it had been the trier 
of fact.99 
The justifications for this deferential standard also tum on the re-
spective functions of trial and appellate courts. Trial courts find 
facts.lOO Appellate courts will not encroach on that function in the 
absence of clear error. In addition, trial courts viewing live testimony 
are better positioned to assess the credibility of witnesses than are ap-
pellate courts that review only transcripts of the testimony.10l The pa-
per record does not allow the appellate court to get the same sense of 
the credibility of a witness that the trial court's actual observation pro-
vides.102 Although credibility determinations are one justification for 
the clear error standard, the same standard applies to all factual find-
opinion is binding within the court's jurisdiction. [d. at 727 & n.80. For a 
discussion of non-precedential opinions, see generally id. 
97. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a). This rule governs only findings of fact made by the 
trial judge. In reviewing facts found by a jury, "[a]ppellate courts are 
bound by a jury's findings when the jury has been properly instructed by 
the trial court and there is competent evidence in the record to support the 
findings." I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882, 887 
(Colo. 1986). A discussion of review of jury decisions is beyond the scope 
of this article, but for a discussion of reviewing such verdicts, see generally 
STEVEN AlAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(3d ed. 1999) and Steven Alan Childress, A Standards of Review Primer, 125 
F.R.D. 319 (1989). 
98. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364,395 (1948)). 
99. [d.; Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th 
Cir. 1988) ("To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than 
just maybe or probably wrong; it must, as one member of this court recently 
stated during oral argument, strike us as wrong with the force of a five-
week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish."). 
100. Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) (pronouncing the axiom 
that findinj? facts is the role of trial courts, not appellate courts, as a "bread 
and butter' principle of appellate review). 
10l. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 143 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial courts on factual questions because the trial court had the op-
portunity to hear and observe the witnesses' testimony). 
lO2. [d. 
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ings, regardless of whether they are based on the testimony of wit-
nesses or other forms of evidence. 103 
The third standard of review is abuse of discretion. This standard is 
also deferential to the trial court. Discretion is the authority to make 
a reasoned choice.104 Many matters within the course of litigation are 
committed to the trial court's discretion. That is, the trial judge has 
the authority to choose from among a range of options. If the trial 
judge could legitimately have chosen one course of action over an-
other, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial judge. 105 
A judge can commit an abuse of discretion in three ways: (1) by 
failing to consider a factor relevant to the decision; (2) by considering 
and giving significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor; or 
(3) by making a clear error of judgment. 106 Challenging a.discretion-
ary decision on the ground that the judge made a clear error of judg-
ment is possible, but is an uphill climb because trial judges do not 
often make decisions entirely outside the range of the appropriate 
options. Arguments based on the other two forms of error are more 
likely to be successful because they focus on the decision-making pro-
cess. For example, if a statute requires a judge to consider specific 
factors in making child custody decisions, the judge may abuse her 
discretion by failing to consider one of the factors. The error in the 
result stems from error in the decisional process, not the judge's error 
in judgment. 
Often, the character of an issue as one of law, fact, or discretion will 
be uncontroversial. In those cases, the determination of the appropri-
ate standard of review will be similarly un controversial. In some cases, 
however, the category into which the issue falls will be subject to de-
bate. Some appeals turn on the resolution of the character of the 
issue and the corresponding standard of review. 107 If an issue could 
arguably be categorized as one of law, fact, or discretion, you may be 
able to persuade a court to characterize it in a way that results in appli-
cation of the standard of review that favors your position. 108 
In addition, some issues are mixed questions of fact and law. Mixed 
questions of fact and law are those "in which the historical facts are 
admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is 
103. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. 
104. See Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984). 
105. Kern, 738 F.2d at 971 ("The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone 
of choice within which the trial courts may go either way."). 
106. Id. at 970. 
107. See, e.g., Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 227 (1991) (stating 
the issue in the case as whether the district court's decision was subject to 
de novo review or some more deferential standard of review); see also CAR-
OLE C. BERRY, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY § 1.10, at 5 (3d ed. 2003). 
108. For a discussion of strategies for persuading a court to apply a standard of 
review favorable to your position, see George A. Sommerville, Standards of 
Appellate Review, LITlG., Spring 1989, at 23,24 and Childress, supra note 97. 
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whether the facts satisfy the [legal] standard, or to put it another way, 
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not 
violated."109 Some mixed questions are reviewed under the clearly er-
roneous standard, while others are reviewed under the de novo stan-
dard. To decide the applicable standard of review for a mixed 
question of fact and law, the court evaluates whether resolution of the 
issue turns more on factual considerations or on the application of 
legal principles.110 If you are arguing a mixed question of fact and 
law, the standard of review may well be a critical element in your 
argument. 
These three standards of review - de novo, clearly erroneous, and 
abuse of discretion - are all standards of judicial review. They must be 
distinguished from standards of legislative review - strict scrutiny, inter-
mediate or heightened scrutiny, and rational basis. I I I Standards of 
legislative review refer to the standards courts use to evaluate the con-
stitutionality of statutes enacted by the legislative branch, a coordinate 
branch of government. Standards of judicial review refer to standards 
109. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 n.19 (1982). Examples of 
mixed questions include the following: whether a defendant received inef-
fective assistance of counsel, Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1352 
(5th Cir. 1981); whether the parties entered into an oral employment con-
tract, Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2001); and 
whether Internal Revenue Service agents acted in good faith in disclosing 
taxpayer information during an investigation, Gandy V. United States, 234 
F.3d 281,284 (5th Cir. 2000). 
110. The concerns of judicial administration are key to the court's analysis of the 
appropriate standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law: 
If application of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquiry 
that is "essentially factual," - one that is founded "on the applica-
tion of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings 
of human conduct," - the concerns of judicial administration will 
favor the district court, and the district court's determination 
should be classified as one of fact reviewable under the clearly erro-
neous standard. If, on the other hand, the question requires us to 
consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and law and to exercise 
judgment about the values that animate legal principles, then the 
concerns of judicial administration will favor the appellate court, 
and the question should be classified as one of law and reviewed de 
novo. 
McConney V. United States, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (cita-
tions omitted), abrogated on other grounds fry Estate of Merchant V. Comm'r., 
947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991); accordVinick V. United States, 205 F.3d 1, 6 
(1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States V. Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1328 (1st 
Cir. 1993» (noting that the court uses a sliding scale of deference in evalu-
ating mixed questions of fact and law, depending on how fact-dependent 
the issue is); see also Miller V. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (noting that 
the classification of an issue as one of fact, law, or mixed fact and law at 
times turns on the court's assessment of which judicial actor, the trial court 
or the appellate court, is in the best position to decide the issue). 
Ill. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 97, § 1.03, at 1-22 to 1-23 (distinguishing 
'Judicial" review of lower court decisions from "constitutional" review of 
legislative choices). 
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appellate courts use to review the decisions of lower courts within the 
judicial branch. 112 
To see the difference, assume that a litigant challenges the constitu-
tionality of a statute by filing suit in the appropriate trial court. The 
trial court will apply one of the three standards of legislative review to 
determine whether the statute is constitutional. Whether a statute 
comports with constitutional requirements is generally a question of 
lawY3 Therefore, if the trial court's decision were appealed, the ap-
pellate court would ordinarily apply de novo review to determine the 
correctness of the trial court's decision regarding which legislative 
standard of review should be applied and whether the statute com-
ports with the appropriate standard. 
In every appeal, the appellate court must determine whether the 
issue or issues presented are within the scope of its review. It must 
then determine whether the issue is one of fact, law, or mixed fact and 
law. That determination will dictate whether the court will conduct 
an independent review of the issue using the de novo standard or give 
deference to the decision below using the clearly erroneous or abuse 
of discretion standard. Although this determination is routine in a 
large number of cases, in some cases the determination of the applica-
ble standard effectively determines the outcome of the case. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Understanding who can appeal, when an appeal can be taken, and 
how much review an appellate court will undertake is essential to un-
derstanding appellate process. A lawyer who does not understand 
these concepts may waste a client's time and money by pursuing a 
frivolous appeal or may lose an opportunity to appeal. The preceding 
discussion does not address every nuance of appellate procedure, but 
it does provide a foundation upon which to build. It should at least 
give you a sufficient understanding of appellate process to recognize 
when issues of standing, appellate jurisdiction, or scope and standard 
of review may affect the conduct of an appeal so that you can research 
these issues in greater depth when appropriate. 
112. Courts also sometimes use the judicial standards of review to evaluate deci-
sions of administrative tribunals in the executive branch. A discussion of 
review of administrative decisions is beyond the scope of this article. For a 
discussion of review of administrative decisions, see generally CHILDRESS & 
DAVIS, supra note 97, pt. 4, §§ 14.01 - 17.06. 
113. United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1104 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a 
trial court's decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute is a ques-
tion of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal). 
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APPENDIX A: TESTING YOUR UNDERSTANDING 
In answering the questions below, assume that federal law applies. 
l. During a criminal trial, two jurors hearing the case (Jurors 4 and 
7) appear to be sleeping. One alternate juror could be substituted for 
one of the sleeping jurors. If both sleeping jurors are dismissed, how-
ever, the judge will have to declare a mistrial. The judge calls counsel 
to the bench to discuss the situation, but they cannot agree on which 
juror should be replaced. To make the decision, the judge calls her 
deputy to the bench and asks the deputy to flip a coin. Heads means 
Juror 4 is replaced, and tails means Juror 7 is replaced. The defen-
dant's attorney says, ''I'm not too sure about this, your honor." The 
judge ignores the attorney and directs the deputy to flip the coin. It 
comes up tails. Juror 7 is replaced, and Juror 4 remains on the panel. 
The defendant is convicted. He appeals, asserting error based on 
the judge's juror replacement decision. 
QUESTION A: The defendant waited until the conclusion of the 
case to seek appellate review of the coin flip decision. Was he re-
quired to wait, or could he have obtained immediate review of the 
coin flip decision? 
QUESTION B: Was the issue properly preserved at the trial level? 
QUESTION C: Assuming that the issue was properly preserved, 
what standard of review will the appellate court apply? 
QUESTION D: Assuming that the issue was not properly preserved, 
will the appellate court review the coin flip decision? 
QUESTION E: Will the defendant win on appeal? 
2. A private school promulgates a policy under which no student is 
permitted to pray in school. At the beginning of the first class period 
each day, students stand and recite the pledge of allegiance, after 
which the students observe a moment of silence. When one student 
begins praying loudly during the moment of silence, the teacher 
throws a white board eraser at her head and tells her to be quiet. The 
eraser misses the student, but the incident upsets her greatly. 
The student decides to sue the school and the teacher. She con-
tacts an advocacy organization devoted to the protection of religious 
freedom, and the organization's legal department agrees to represent 
her. Acting on the student's behalf, the organization files suit in U.S. 
District Court, claiming that the school's policy violates the student's 
First Amendment rights and that the teacher committed the common 
law tort of assault against the student by throwing the eraser at her. 
The complaint in the case of Student v. Teacher and School seeks an 
injunction to force the school to change its policy and money dam-
ages against the teacher. 
At the close of the discovery phase of the case, the teacher files a 
motion for summary judgment on the assault claim, which the plain-
tiff opposes. The court denies the motion on the ground that there 
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are disputes of material fact on the assault claim. Thereafter, the 
plaintiff and the school file cross-motions for summary judgment on 
the First Amendment claim. The court grants the school's motion, 
enters judgment in favor of the school, and denies the request for an 
injunction requiring the school to change its policy. The case goes to 
trial against the teacher. The plaintiff wins at trial. 
The student decides not to appeal the ruling in favor of the school, 
so the organization files its own notice of appeal in the case. 
QUESTION A: Could the teacher have taken an immediate appeal 
of the order denying the motion for summary judgment? 
QUESTION B: Could the order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the school have been immediately appealed? 
QUESTION C: Is the organization entitled to appeal the order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the school? 
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APPENDIX B: ANSWERS 
1. Coin flip hypothetical. (This scenario is based on Golsun v. 
United States, 592 A.2d 1054 (D.C. 1991).) 
QUESTION A: The defendant waited until the conclusion of the 
case to seek appellate review of the coin flip decision. Was he re-
quired to wait, or could he have obtained immediate review of the 
coin flip decision? 
The only way the defendant could have obtained immediate review 
of the coin flip decision is through a petition for a writ of mandamus. 
It seems unlikely, however, that the defendant would have availed 
himself of this procedure, given that his attorney was ambivalent at 
best about the coin flip, as discussed more fully below. 
The order was not a final order; thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 would not 
confer appellate jurisdiction. Immediate review under 28 U.s.c. 
§ 1292(a) would not be available because the order does not involve 
an injunction. This is a criminal case, not a civil case. Thus, neither 
28 U.s.c. § 1292(b) nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) ap-
plies. The decision regarding the substitution of the juror is not a 
collateral order because it does not finally resolve the disputed ques-
tion. The judge could revisit the decision regarding substitution of 
the juror and declare a mistrial if necessary. Further, the order is ef-
fectively reviewable on appeal. 
QUESTION B: Was the issue properly preserved at the trial level? 
Although expressing some doubt about the coin flip procedure, the 
defendant's attorney did not state an objection on the record. The 
attorney's ambivalent statement is not sufficient to put the judge on 
notice that the coin flip was a problem. Thus, it did not give the judge 
adequate opportunity to choose another method of decision-making. 
The defendant's attorney seemed to be hedging his or her bets, hop-
ing the result of the coin flip would be favorable to the defendant, but 
trying to keep the defendant's options open for appeal if the result 
did not turn out favorably. This is not a permissible strategy. The 
attorney's expression of doubt would not qualify as a proper objection 
and would not be sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
QUESTION C: Assuming that the issue was properly preserved, 
what standard of review will the appellate court apply? 
The court will apply abuse of discretion. The judge had a choice to 
make and could validly have chosen to replace Juror 4 or Juror 7, 
declare a mistrial, or take other corrective measures to ensure that the 
jury was paying attention to the case. 
QUESTION D: Assuming that the issue was not properly preserved, 
will the appellate court review the coin flip decision? 
The only way for the court to review the issue on appeal if it was not 
properly preserved is under the plain error doctrine. This seems like 
an attractive case in which to apply the plain error doctrine because it 
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seems so obvious that the defendant's attorney should have objected 
strenuously to the coin flip. Under the Supreme Court's test, how-
ever, the error probably does not rise to the level of plain error. 
The first two elements of the test are satisfied. The judge commit-
ted an error by leaving a discretionary decision to chance. Further, 
the error is plain. Clearly, a coin flip is not an acceptable method of 
judicial decision-making. The question is whether the error affected 
substantial rights. The defendant's attorney was permitted to partici-
pate in the juror substitution decision, and as noted above, seemed to 
be hedging his or her bets as a litigation strategy. Because the judge, 
in the exercise of her discretion, could validly have substituted either 
juror, it is not clear that the decision-making methodology employed 
actually affected the defendant's rights. The court in Golsun found 
that using a coin flip to decide which of two sleeping jurors to dismiss 
was not plain error, although the facts of that case are more complex 
than those of the hypothetical. 592 A.2d at 1058-59. This illustrates 
how difficult it is to obtain review using the plain error doctrine. 
Of course, if the court were to find that the error affected substan-
tial rights, it probably would exercise its discretion to correct the error 
because using a coin flip to decide a discretionary matter seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings. Note also that the defendant might have other options for 
challenging his conviction even if the appellate court refuses to con-
sider the coin flip issue on direct appeal. For example, the defendant 
might be able to mount a collateral attack on his conviction on the 
ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
QUESTION E: Will the defendant win on appeal? 
If the issue had been properly preserved so that the appellate court 
would apply the abuse of discretion standard, the defendant would 
win. Flipping a coin is not an exercise of discretion; it is the abdica-
tion of discretion because it leaves the decision to chance, not rea-
soned choice. Golsun, 592 A.2d at 1057-58. Because the issue was not 
properly preserved, however, the defendant will lose because the er-
ror does not rise to the level of plain error, as discussed above. 
2. First Amendment hypothetical. 
QUESTION A: Could the teacher have taken an immediate appeal 
of the order denying the motion for summary judgment? 
The teacher would not be able to take an immediate appeal. The 
denial of summary judgment is not a final order resolving the litiga-
tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291; all it does is allow the trial to go 
forward. 
The order does not involve an injunction; thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) 
does not apply. Because the court denied the teacher's motion on the 
basis of factual disputes, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) probably is not applica-
ble. A factual dispute is unlikely to raise any controlling question of 
law about which there is substantial basis for difference of opinion. 
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Even if it did, allowing an immediate appeal probably would not mate-
rially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because the 
First Amendment claim would remain pending. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) does not apply because, al-
though the case involves multiple claims and parties, the order did 
not resolve any claim against any party. The order is not a collateral 
order. The assault claim is integral to the merits of the dispute, and 
the order can effectively be reviewed on appeal. 
A petition for a writ of mandamus to force the trial court to enter 
judgment in the teacher's favor on the assault claim is not likely to 
succeed because the judge acted within his jurisdiction in deciding 
the motion. 
QUESTION B: Could the order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the school have been immediately appealed? 
The order granting the school's motion for summary judgment 
could have been appealed immediately. It is not a final order under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, but appellate jurisdiction would lie pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a) because the order denies a request for an injunction. 
Further, the order resolves all of the claims against the school, thus 
making it eligible for certification as a final order pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 
Depending on the nature of the issues in the case, it is possible that 
the First Amendment claim raises a controlling question of law about 
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. This 
would potentially make the order eligible for immediate appeal pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), although an immediate appeal probably 
would not materially advance the termination of the litigation, given 
the pending assault claim. The order is not a collateral order because 
it goes to the very heart of the case and is effectively reviewable on 
appeal. 
A petition for a writ of mandamus to force the district court to grant 
the injunction is unlikely to succeed and in any event is unnecessary 
because the order is immediately appealable on the grounds discussed 
above. 
QUESTION C: Is the organization entitled to appeal the order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the school? 
Although the organization may feel aggrieved by the decision, it is 
not a party to the case. The student is the plaintiff; the organization's 
lawyers were merely representing her. Unless the organization is per-
mitted to intervene for purposes of the appeal, it will not be allowed 
to pursue the appeal. 
